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Abstract: We study two bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedures with complete information and 
endogenous agenda, where each issue is associated with a finite set of alternatives. In both procedures, 
when bargaining frictions are small, we find a large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements, including 
ones with arbitrarily long delays. Thus, this paper extends the previous results of van Damme et al. (1990) 
and Muthoo (1991) for the single-issue case to multi-issue cases. Furthermore, we show that in the first 
procedure (issue-by-issue bargaining), the stationary subgame perfect equilibria alone may support a large 
multiplicity of inefficient agreements. Confronting a recent study, this implies that it is not necessary to 
appeal to “strictly controversial” issues in a bargaining problem in order to find multiplicity and delay in 
agreements. 
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Rubinstein’s (1982) theory predicts a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in
his alternating oﬀer model, where the pie is divisible arbitrarily. Van Damme
et al. (1990) and Muthoo (1991) investigated the implication of the ﬁniteness
of alternatives, interacting with small bargaining frictions, and obtained a
large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements. In this note, we show how the
multiplicity result extends to multi-issue bargaining procedures.
We consider two bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedures with com-
plete information, where each issue is associated with a ﬁnite set of alterna-
tives. The ﬁrst procedure is the issue-by-issue procedure studied by In and
Serrano (2000). In this procedure, which we refer to as restricted agenda
bargaining, parties bargain using alternating oﬀers according to the follow-
ing rules. The proposer makes an oﬀer on one and only one of the remaining
issues, but he can choose which issue to propose on. The responder either
accepts or rejects. If he accepts, that issue is considered settled and he pro-
poses on any one and only one of the remaining issues, and so on. If he
rejects, there is a probability of breakdown of negotiations, while with the
rest of probability the rejector makes a counterproposal on any one and only
one of the pending issues, and so on. The game ends either with breakdown
of negotiations or when all issues have been settled. The agenda is there-
fore endogenous because each proposer can choose which issue comes to the
negotiation table on each round. The second procedure is the one studied
by Inderst (2000) and In and Serrano (2003). In this procedure, which we
call unrestricted agenda bargaining, each proposer can make an oﬀer on any
subset of the remaining issues. With this only modiﬁcation, the rules are the
same as in the ﬁrst procedure.
In both procedures, when bargaining frictions are small, we ﬁnd a large
multiplicity of equilibrium agreements, including ones with arbitrarily long
delays. Furthermore, we show that in the ﬁrst procedure (issue-by-issue
bargaining), the stationary subgame perfect equilibria alone may support a
large multiplicity of ineﬃcient agreements.
Confronting a recent study by Inderst (2000), the results for the second
procedure imply that it is not necessary to appeal to“strictly controversial”
issues in a bargaining problem in order to ﬁnd multiplicity and delay in
agreements.
12 Bargaining Procedures and Payoﬀs
We consider two multi-issue bargaining procedures. Two players 1 and 2 are
bargaining over how to split l issues or “pies,” where l < ∞. The set of
alternatives for each issue is ﬁnite. Since l < ∞, the set of alternatives for all
issues is also ﬁnite. Let L be the set of issues {1,2,...,l}. The size of each
issue has been normalized to 1. Let Xk denote the set of all alternatives for
the k-th issue in terms of player 1’s share. Similarly, let XS denote the set
of all alternatives for the issues in S ⊆ L. Note that we use the same term
“alternative” both for an element of Xk and for an element of XS. Starting at
time t = 0, bargaining takes place over potentially inﬁnitely-many discrete
periods according to one of the following bargaining procedures. In even
periods player 1 makes an oﬀer, and in odd periods player 2 makes an oﬀer.
For i = 1,2 and S ⊆ L, the restricted agenda bargaining procedure
γS
i (δ) induces an inﬁnite horizon game of perfect information and it is deﬁned
recursively.
• The ﬁrst move corresponds to player i, who makes a proposal: he
chooses one and only one of the pending issues k ∈ S and oﬀers the
split (xk,1 − xk), where xk ∈ Xk.
• Player j can then either accept or reject this proposal.
– If the proposal is accepted, issue k is split accordingly and the
procedure γ
S\{k}
j (δ) is followed.
– If the proposal is rejected, the procedure γS
j (δ) is followed with
probability δ (0 ≤ δ < 1), whereas negotiations break down with
probability 1 − δ. In the latter case, both players receive a zero
share from those issues on which there was no agreement.
The negotiations end either with the breakdown outcome, or when the
procedure γ∅
i (δ) must be followed for i = 1,2.
For i = 1,2 and S ⊆ L, the unrestricted agenda bargaining proce-
dure ΓS
i (δ) induces an inﬁnite horizon game of perfect information and it is
deﬁned recursively.
2• The ﬁrst move corresponds to player i, who makes a proposal: he
chooses an arbitrary subset of the pending issues T ⊆ S,T 6= ∅ and
oﬀers the split (xT,1 − xT), where xT ∈ XT.1
• Player j can then either accept or reject this entire proposal (he is not
allowed to accept the proposal only for a strict subset of T and reject
the rest).
– If the proposal is accepted, issues T are split accordingly and the
procedure Γ
S\T
j (δ) is followed.
– If the proposal is rejected, the procedure ΓS
j (δ) is followed with
probability δ (0 ≤ δ < 1), whereas negotiations break down with
probability 1 − δ. In the latter case, both players receive a zero
share from those issues on which there was no agreement.
The negotiations end either with the breakdown outcome, or when the
procedure Γ∅
i(δ) must be followed for i = 1,2.
We shall refer to the procedure γL
i (δ) and ΓL
i (δ) simply as γi(δ) and Γi(δ).
Note our use of the word “procedure” to refer to γS
i (δ) or ΓS
i (δ), as opposed
to the word “game,” which should be employed to refer to γS
i (δ,x−S) or
ΓS
i (δ,x−S). That is, the shares x−S agreed prior to the game in question do
not aﬀect the rules of negotiation, but they do aﬀect the players’ payoﬀs.
Let xL = (x1,x2,...,xl) and tL = (t1,t2,...,tl). The outcome (xL,tL)
means that they reach
• an agreement on x1 at t1 if the negotiation has not broken down by t1,
• an agreement on x2 at t2 if the negotiation has not broken down by t2,
• ···, and
• an agreement on xl at tl if the negotiation has not broken down by tl.
1 We use the following notation for the comparison of two arbitrary vectors x and
y: x ≥ y means xk ≥ yk for all k; x > y means x ≥ y and x 6= y; and x  y means
xk > yk for all k. Also, xT = (xk)k∈T, while 0T and 1T are vectors with |T| zeros and
ones, respectively. However, we write 0 and 1 instead of 0T and 1T when it is clear.
3If any element of tL is inﬁnite, say tk = ∞, then it means that they disagree
perpetually on the k−th issue. In this case, xk is immaterial and we make
xk = 0. Therefore, ((0,0,...,0),(∞,∞,...,∞)) means that they disagree
perpetually on all issues. We call an outcome (xL,tL) an immediate agree-
ment if no rejection occurs on any issue. Therefore, an outcome (xL,tL) is
an immediate agreement if min{t1,t2,...,tl} = 0 and there is no skip of an
integer number in (t1,t2,...,tl). Similarly, (xS,tS) is an immediate agree-
ment in the subgame γS
i (δ,x−S) or ΓS
i (δ,x−S) if no rejection occurs on any
issue in S.
Both players are von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizers.
We make the following assumptions on the utility functions u1(x1,...,xl) and
u2(1 − x1,...,1 − xl):2
• A0 (normalization):
ui(0L) = 0 for i = 1,2.
• A1 (interior strong monotonicity):
ui(x) > ui(y) if x > y and x  0, and
ui(x) ≥ ui(y) if x > y and some element of x is zero.
Assumption A1 is so weak an assumption that most well-known utility func-
tions including Cobb-Douglas, linear, and quasi-linear utility functions sat-
isfy it. We shall sometimes use a stronger assumption, which linear utility
functions satisfy:
• A10 (strong monotonicity):
ui(x) > ui(y) if x > y.
In this paper, we employ subgame perfect equilibrium as our solution
concept, which we also refer to as an SPE or simply as an equilibrium.
2 We use utility functions for our models, but they can be easily modiﬁed to preference-
ordering based models, as is Muthoo’s (1991) model.
43 Results
We deﬁne a restriction of XS with respect to x∗
S as {xS ∈ XS : xS\{k} =
x∗
S\{k} for some k ∈ S}, and denote it by XS|x∗
S. Figure 1 illustrates XS and
XS|x∗
S in the utility space. In it, L = S = {1,2}, and the utility functions











issue is associated with possible divisions of a pie into shares in one-tenth,
and x∗
S = ( 7
10, 3
10).
We say that an alternative xS ∈ XS is an eﬃcient alternative of
XS given x−S if there does not exist x0
S ∈ XS such that u1(x0
S,x−S) ≥
u1(xS,x−S) and u2(1 − x0
S,1 − x−S) ≥ u2(1 − xS,1 − x−S) with at least one
strict inequality. We say that an alternative xS ∈ XS is an interior alter-
native of XS if 0S  xS  1. In Figure 1, x∗
S is an interior alternative of
XS and an eﬃcient alternative of XS|x∗
S, but not an eﬃcient alternative of
XS.
Lemma 1 Let u1 and u2 satisfy Assumptions A0 and A1. If x∗
L ∈ XL is an
eﬃcient or interior alternative of XL, then for any S ⊆ L, x∗





L be an eﬃcient alternative of XL. Then for any S ⊆ L, x∗
S is an
eﬃcient alternative of XS given x∗
−S. This is true because {yL ∈ XL : y−S =
x∗
−S} is just a subset of XL. Now, for any S ⊆ L, x∗
S is an eﬃcient alternative
of XS|x∗
S given x∗
−S. This is true because {yL ∈ XL : yS ∈ XS|x∗
S,y−S = x∗
−S}
is again a subset of {yL ∈ XL : y−S = x∗
−S}.
Now let x∗
L be an interior alternative of XL. Then by Assumption A1,
for any S ⊆ L and for any k ∈ S, x∗
S is an eﬃcient alternative of {yS ∈ XS :
yS\{k} = x∗
S\{k}} given x∗
−S. Note that XS|x∗
S = ∪k∈S{yS ∈ XS : yS\{k} =
x∗
S\{k}}. Therefore, x∗
S is an eﬃcient alternative of XS|x∗
S given x∗
−S.
Proposition 1 Consider the restricted agenda bargaining procedure γi(δ) for
δ < 1 large enough. Let u1 and u2 satisfy Assumptions A0 and A1. Then,
an immediate agreement on any eﬃcient or interior alternative of XL in any
ordering of the issues can be supported by an SPE.
Proof. Let x∗
L be an eﬃcient or interior alternative of XL. Let δ < 1 be



































































































r r r r r r r r
r
r







































{(u1(xS),u2(1 − xS)) : xS ∈ XS|x∗
S}
Figure 1: XS and XS|x∗
S in Utility Space










and u2(1 − yS,1 − x
∗





• and there does not exist any alternative zS ∈ XS|x∗
S,zS 6= x∗
S such that
u2(1 − zS,1 − x
∗












Such δ < 1 always exists since x∗
S is an eﬃcient alternative of XS|x∗
S given
x∗
−S (Lemma 1) and XS|x∗
S is ﬁnite.
Let O be the ordering of the issues 1,2,...,l that we want to support.
Let O(S) be the ﬁrst element of S according to the ordering O. Consider the
following pair of strategies.
• (i) Whenever the set of pending issues is S and an agreement has been
reached on x∗
−S (including the case of S = L), player 1 chooses the issue
O(S) and oﬀers the split of the issue (x∗
O(S),1−x∗
O(S)), and accepts the





• (ii) Whenever the set of pending issues is S and an agreement has been
reached on x∗
−S (including the case of S = L), player 2 chooses the issue
O(S) and oﬀers the split of the issue (x∗
O(S),1−x∗
O(S)), and accepts the






• (iii) In subgames γS
i (δ,x−S) where x−S is diﬀerent from x∗
−S, any SPE
pair of strategies would do.
It is clear that if this pair of strategies are played, the immediate agree-
ment on x∗
L in the ordering of the issues O will follow. This ordering O is
the agenda at the equilibrium. We claim that there is no proﬁtable deviation
from the strategies speciﬁed in (i) and (ii). Since x∗
S is an eﬃcient alternative
of XS|x∗
S given x∗
−S (Lemma 1), the proposer cannot deviate proﬁtably. It
is not proﬁtable for the responder to reject an oﬀer that he is supposed to
accept according to the above strategy. Finally, the conditions on δ guaran-
tee that it is not proﬁtable for the responder to accept an oﬀer that he is
supposed to reject according to the above strategy.
7With a stronger assumption A10 replacing A1, we can say something more
about the multiplicity result.
Proposition 2 Consider the restricted agenda bargaining procedure γi(δ) for
δ < 1 large enough. Let u1 and u2 satisfy Assumptions A0 and A10. Then, an
immediate agreement on any alternative of XL in any ordering of the issues
can be supported by a stationary SPE.
Proof. Let x∗
L be an element of XL. Let δ < 1 be large enough so that for
any S ⊆ L and for any x−S ∈ X−S,






and u2(1 − yS,1 − x−S) ≥ u2(1 − x
∗
S,1 − x−S),
• and there does not exist any alternative zS ∈ XS|x∗
S,zS 6= x∗
S such that
u2(1 − zS,1 − x−S) > δu2(1 − x
∗
S,1 − x−S)
and u1(zS,x−S) ≥ u1(x
∗
S,x−S).
Although these conditions for δ are stronger than those in the proof of Propo-
sition 1, such δ < 1 always exists given Assumption A10 (strong monotonic-
ity).
Note also that given Assumption A10, x∗
S is an eﬃcient alternative of
XS|x∗
S given x−S. Therefore, an immediate agreement on x∗
L in any ordering
of the issues O can be supported by the following stationary SPE.
• (i) Whenever the set of pending issues is S, player 1 chooses the issue
O(S) and oﬀers the split of the issue (x∗
O(S),1−x∗
O(S)), and accepts the
oﬀer of (yk,1 − yk) if and only if u1(yk,x∗
S\{k},x−S) ≥ u1(x∗
S,x−S).
• (ii) Whenever the set of pending issues is S, player 2 chooses the issue
O(S) and oﬀers the split of the issue (x∗
O(S),1 − x∗
O(S)), and accepts
the oﬀer of (yk,1 − yk) if and only if u2(1 − yk,1 − x∗
S\{k},1 − x−S) ≥
u2(1 − x∗
S,1 − x−S).
8In this case, therefore, the stationary subgame perfect equilibria alone
support a large multiplicity of ineﬃcient agreements. In fact, any alternative
can be agreed immediately at a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium.
It is now standard to construct equilibria with delay from multiple equi-
libria (see Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Avery and Zemsky (1994), Busch
and Wen (1995), and In and Serrano (2000) for related constructions).
Proposition 3 Consider the restricted agenda bargaining procedure γi(δ) for
δ < 1 large enough. Let u1 and u2 satisfy Assumptions A0 and A10. Then,
any outcome (xL,tL) including outcomes involving perpetual disagreement on
one or more issues can be supported by a nonstationary SPE.
Proof. Note that for any S ⊆ L and for any x−S ∈ X−S, 1S and 0S are
eﬃcient alternatives of XS given x−S because of Assumption A10. Therefore,
by Proposition 1, the immediate agreements on 1S and 0S are supported by
an SPE in a subgame γS
i (δ,x−S) for δ < 1 large enough. Using these extreme
equilibria as rewards and punishments in case of deviations, we can support
any outcome (xL,tL) by a nonstationary SPE.
Let L = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ··· ∪ Sn with S1,S2,...,Sn mutually disjoint, and let
(xL,tL) be as follows:
• After T1-period of delay (T1 rejections by both players together), they
agree immediately (without any rejection) on (xS1,1−xS1), in a certain
ordering of the issues in S1.
• Then, after T2-period of delay, they agree immediately on (xS2,1−xS2),
in a certain ordering of the issues in S2.
• ···
• Then, after Tn−1-period of delay, they agree immediately on (xSn−1,1−
xSn−1), in a certain ordering of the issues in Sn−1.
• Then, they disagree perpetually on the issues in Sn.
This outcome is supported by the following nonstationary SPE.
• (i) During the periods of delay or perpetual disagreement, player 1
oﬀers (1,0) for any remaining issue and player 2 rejects it, and player
2 oﬀers (0,1) for any remaining issue and player 1 rejects it.
9• (ii) During the periods of immediate agreement on S1,S2,...,Sn−1, the
proposer chooses an issue according to the ordering that we want to
support and oﬀers the exact split that we want to support, and the
responder accepts it.
• (iii) If player 1 deviates from the above rule (i) or (ii) and makes a
diﬀerent oﬀer, then player 2 accepts the oﬀer if and only if the issue is
the last remaining issue and the split oﬀered is (0,1). Otherwise, player
2 rejects the oﬀer, and both players start to play the SPE supporting
the immediate agreement on 0T speciﬁed in Proposition 1 (T is the set
of the remaining issues at that time). If player 1 deviates from the
above rule (i) and accepts the oﬀer (0,1) for any issue which is not the
last issue, then the SPE supporting the immediate agreement on 0T
speciﬁed in Proposition 1 is played (T is the set of the remaining issues
at that time). If player 1 deviates from the above rule (ii) and rejects
the oﬀer that he was supposed to accept, then the SPE supporting the
immediate agreement on 0T speciﬁed in Proposition 1 is played (T is
the set of the remaining issues at that time).
• (iv) If player 2 deviates from the above rule (i) or (ii) and makes a
diﬀerent oﬀer, then player 1 accepts the oﬀer if and only if the issue is
the last remaining issue and the split oﬀered is (1,0). Otherwise, player
1 rejects the oﬀer, and both players start to play the SPE supporting
the immediate agreement on 1T speciﬁed in Proposition 1 (T is the set
of the remaining issues at that time). If player 2 deviates from the
above rule (i) and accepts the oﬀer (1,0) for any issue which is not the
last issue, then the SPE supporting the immediate agreement on 1T
speciﬁed in Proposition 1 is played (T is the set of the remaining issues
at that time). If player 1 deviates from the above rule (ii) and rejects
the oﬀer that he was supposed to accept, then the SPE supporting the
immediate agreement on 1T speciﬁed in Proposition 1 is played (T is
the set of the remaining issues at that time).
Even outcomes involving perpetual disagreement on one or more issues
can be supported by an SPE once the issues are only ﬁnitely divisible, which
contrasts with In and Serrano’s (2000) result that perpetual disagreement
10cannot be supported by an SPE in the restricted agenda multi-issue bargain-
ing when the issues are arbitrarily divisible.
The following two propositions show the multiplicity and delay results for
the unrestricted agenda bargaining procedure Γi(δ). In this procedure, we
call an outcome (xL,tL) a bundled agreement if t1 = t2 = ··· = tl, and an
unbundled agreement otherwise.
Proposition 4 Consider the unrestricted agenda bargaining procedure Γi(δ)
for δ < 1 large enough. Let u1 and u2 satisfy Assumptions A0 and A1. Then,
an immediate and bundled agreement on any eﬃcient alternative of XL can
be supported by an SPE.
Proof. Let x∗
L be an eﬃcient alternative of XL. Let δ < 1 be large enough
so that for any S ⊆ L,

















−S) < u2(1 − zS,1 − x
∗





Such δ < 1 always exists because of the ﬁniteness of XS.
Consider the following pair of strategies.
• (i) Whenever the set of pending issues is S and an agreement has been
reached on x∗
−S (including the case of S = L), player 1 bundles all
the remaining issues and oﬀers (x∗
S,1 − x∗
S), and accepts the oﬀer of





• (ii) Whenever the set of pending issues is S and an agreement has been
reached on x∗
−S (including the case of S = L), player 2 bundles all the
remaining issues and oﬀers (x∗
S,1−x∗
S), and accepts the oﬀer of (yT,1−
yT) if and only if u2(1 − yT,1 − x∗
S\T,1 − x∗
−S) ≥ u2(1 − x∗
S,1 − x∗
−S).
• (iii) In subgames ΓS
i (δ,x−S) where x−S is diﬀerent from x∗
−S, any SPE
pair of strategies would do.
11It is clear that if this pair of strategies are played, the immediate agree-
ment on x∗
L will follow. We claim that there is no proﬁtable deviation from
the strategies speciﬁed in (i) and (ii). Since x∗
S is an eﬃcient alternative of
XS given x∗
−S, the proposer cannot deviate proﬁtably. It is not proﬁtable
for the responder to reject an oﬀer that he is supposed to accept according
to the above strategy. Finally, the conditions on δ guarantee that it is not
proﬁtable for the responder to accept an oﬀer that he is supposed to reject
according to the above strategy.
Remark: It can be also shown that an immediate and unbundled agreement
on any eﬃcient alternative of XL can be supported by an SPE. In such an
equilibrium, they agree sequentially on disjoint subsets of L without any
rejection of an oﬀer.
Proposition 5 Consider the unrestricted agenda bargaining procedure Γi(δ)
for δ < 1 large enough. Let u1 and u2 satisfy Assumptions A0 and A10. Then,
any outcome (xL,tL) including outcomes involving perpetual disagreement on
one or more issues can be supported by a nonstationary SPE.
Proof. It can be proven by a similar logic as in Proposition 3.
Propositions 4 and 5 imply that once the ﬁniteness of alternatives is as-
sumed, it is not necessary to appeal to “strictly controversial” issues in a
bargaining problem in order to ﬁnd multiplicity and delay in agreements as
in Inderst (2000). In the example provided by Inderst (2000), the force that
makes the multiplicity and delay is not the introduction of “strictly controver-
sial” issues, but the ﬁniteness of alternatives. We provide an example to show
that it is possible to have a unique SPE payoﬀ with the introduction of strictly
controversial and arbitrarily divisible issues. Let u1(x1,x2,x3) = x1+x2+x3
and u2(1 − x1,1 − x2,1 − x3) = (1 − x1) − 1
2(1 − x2) − 1
4(1 − x3), where
0 ≤ xk ≤ 1 for k = 1,2,3. Issue 1 is a mutually beneﬁcial issue and issues 2
and 3 are strictly controversial issues. Note that the set of alternatives is not
ﬁnite any more. The equation for the Pareto frontier of the utility possibility






4u1 + 1, u1 ∈ [0,1]
−1
2u1 + 5
4, u1 ∈ [1,2]
−u1 + 9
4, u1 ∈ [2,3].
12Then, in the unrestricted agenda bargaining procedure Γi(δ) for any δ ∈
[0,1), there exists a unique SPE payoﬀ. If δ ≥ 2
3 for example, the unique






1+δ) and the unique SPE payoﬀ in the






















1+δ) is obtained from
x1 = 0, x2 = 5
2
δ
1+δ − 1, and x3 = 1. As δ → 1, these payoﬀs approach (5
4, 5
8),
which can be obtained from x1 = 0, x2 = 1
4, and x3 = 1. The equilibrium





                       
                       
( 1
1+δ + x2 + x3, δ
1+δ − 1
2(1 − x2) − 1
4(1 − x3)) if S = {1} and i = 1
( δ
1+δ + x2 + x3, 1
1+δ − 1
2(1 − x2) − 1
4(1 − x3)) if S = {1} and i = 2
(x1 + x3,(1 − x1) − 1
4(1 − x3)) if S = {2}
(x1 + x2,(1 − x1) − 1





4(1 − x3)) if S = {1,2} and i = 1
(
(3−2δ)δ
2−δ2 + x3, 4−3δ
2(2−δ2) − 1





2(1 − x2)) if S = {1,3} and i = 1
(
(7−4δ)δ
4−δ2 + x2, 16−7δ
4(4−δ2) − 1
2(1 − x2)) if S = {1,3} and i = 2.














1+δ) if S = {1,2,3} and i = 2.
The SPE strategies for the game Γi(δ) follow. In them, let S ⊆ L.
• (i) In the initial period of subgames ΓS
i (δ,x−S), player i makes a pro-
posal on all remaining issues. He oﬀers to player j the payoﬀ u∗
j(x−S)
and asks for himself u∗
i(x−S).
• (ii) In the initial period of subgames ΓS
i (δ,x−S), player j accepts a
proposal if and only if the utility u that he would get by accepting
(assuming he receives the equilibrium SPE payoﬀ to the ﬁrst proposer
as speciﬁed above, for the issues still pending) satisﬁes u ≥ u∗
j(x−S).
The uniqueness of the SPE payoﬀ can be proved in the same way as in In
and Serrano (1993).
It can be shown, however, that in the restricted agenda bargaining proce-
dure γi(δ), there is a large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements, including
ones with delay for δ < 1 large enough, which is due to the agenda restriction.
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